Refugee Crisis and Securitization of Migration in the European Union

Anish Agnihotri

Research Scholar

Centre for European Studies

School of International Relations

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

anishagnihotri1999@gmail.com

Abstract

In 2015, Europe experienced an unprecedented influx of refugees driven by conflicts, political instability, and socio-economic hardship in the Middle East, North Africa, and other regions. This mass migration has posed a multifaceted challenge for the European Union (EU), leading to social tensions, economic burdens, and political fragmentation among the member states. Germany adopted the Open Door Policy and welcomed over a million refugees. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said, *'Wir schaffen das'* (We can manage it). However, Merkel's lead on the refugees provided the right-wing political parties a new lease on life in Germany and other member states. In contrast, Hungary, one of the first refugee-recipient countries, took a strong stance against accepting refugees under the Dublin regulation. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has vehemently opposed the migrants into his country and has portrayed them as a security threat to their nation. The increasingly deepening illiberal-liberal cleavage between member states vis-a-vis the European Union has posed a significant challenge to European integration. Using Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver's theory of securitization and de-securitization, this paper perceives migration as an existential threat to the EU member states. Through a case study of Germany's de-securitization and Hungary's securitization of migration, this paper examines the migration-security nexus for the EU member states and explores the implications of the refugee crisis in the EU integration. It also analyses the EU's policy responses, such as the Common Asylum Policy. Finally, this paper concludes that the audience has more effectively accepted the securitization process than the de-securitization process in EU politics.

Keywords: migration, identity, securitization, European integration, right-wing populism

Introduction

In 2015, hundreds of thousands of people fled across the Mediterranean Sea to escape war and persecution in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan and arrived on European shores. Europe has already started recording an increased number of refugees and migrants in the 2010s due to the conflicts in various parts of Asia and Africa, which surged to more than one million at the end of 2015, which was nearly double that of 1992 after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The main routes used by the refugees to reach Europe were the Mediterranean Sea route from Libya to Italy and the Aegean Sea route from Turkey to Greece. Hundreds of migrants were reported to have died attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea in 2015. Following the arrival of an unprecedented number of refugees and migrants, the European countries reacted by closing their borders to their neighboring countries. Hungary built a barbed wire fence along its border with Serbia, Romania, and Croatia. Germany remained the primary destination country for migrants, receiving the most asylum applications, followed by Hungary in 2015 (Quinn, 2016). Hungary received the most asylum applications of any EU country per capita but approved to the lowest. Such a massive influx of refugees and migrants sparked heated debates in Europe and broadened the East-West divide over their resettlement under the Dublin Regulation. Hungary, one of the first refugee-recipient countries, took a strong stance against accepting refugees and refused to comply with the obligations set out in the Dublin regulations. Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán vehemently opposed the migrants in his country and portrayed them as a threat to sovereignty and cultural identity, which led to the securitization of migration in Hungary. He adopted anti-immigration policies and continued to take an anti-EU stand.

On the other hand, Germany adopted the Open Door Policy and welcomed over a million refugees into its territory. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel said, *'Wir schaffen das'* (We can manage it). She promised that Germans would handle the crisis by assisting the refugees and allocating resources to develop their basic skills for integration into the German society and labor market (Hesse et al., 2019). Hence, Germany's adoption of cosmopolitan liberalism led to the de-securitization of migration.

However, over the last decades, a sharp cleavage has emerged over the issue of handling refugees within the European Union, which can be understood by Germany's and Hungary's contrasting narratives and their responses to the European refugee crisis of 2015. Hence, this paper examines two contrasting discourses on migration vis-a-vis security to understand the

geopolitical divisions within the European Union. This paper analyses the verbal speeches of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on migration between January 2015 and December 2016 to answer the research question of whether the conception of the 'Others' really threatens the notion of 'Our' identity in Germany or Hungary. Secondary data has been collected from the Eurobarometer, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), and the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH). Critical discourse analysis has been employed to analyze these data as speech acts. The paper uses migrants and refugees interchangeably, describing both as people crossing international borders.

Exploring Migration-Security Nexus

Migration has been an intrinsic part of human life since human society. People often move from one place to another to escape inter-state wars, territorial conflicts, and socio-political sufferings and pursue a better life standard. International migration is not a new phenomenon and has thus been extensively covered in the literature. According to the 2018 World Migration Report, the total number of international migrants was about 244 million in 2015, with Europe hosting almost one-third of them (IOM, 2018).

In the last century, many liberal democracies have loosened their immigration policies, mainly due to their self-interested reasons. During the Cold War, several refugees fleeing communist countries were granted asylum in the capitalist countries, i.e., the West. These asylums were seen not as a security threat because they were ideologically on the Allies' side. Immigration was encouraged in the post-war period to meet the labor shortage for the reconstruction of Europe. In the 1960s and 1970s, Germany signed several agreements with Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey to recruit laborers (Gibney, 2004). However, in the 1980s and the 1990s, European countries slowly moved to adopt restrictive asylum policies vis-a-vis immigration. Four primary reasons are there. First, the number of asylum-seeking applications suddenly increased in the early 1990s after the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Loescher, 2001); Second, immigrants were no longer seen through the frame of ideology (Chimni, 1998); Third, the northern European states saw a rise in domestic unemployment; and Fourth, the changing religious status and geography of asylum applicants who were no longer white Europeans but from Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

After the end of the Cold War, migration was looked at through the frame of national security. Hence, the concept of securitization of migration developed. The Copenhagen School

proposed the securitization theory (Buzan, 1983). Earlier during the Cold War period, when security was defined in terms of military power, migration was never seen as a severe threat to the country's sovereignty and cultural identity. The security studies mostly neglected the migration-security nexus during the Cold War. The Copenhagen School of Security Studies embarked on the postpositivist movement in international relations and broadened the conception of security (Narayan et al., 2017), (Narayan et al., 2020).

Migration and security are intricately related to each other. Migration is an international security issue as well as a national security matter. Migration is perceived chiefly as a matter of security for the host countries for two reasons. First, it affects international border-crossing mechanisms and border control policies. Second, migrants are often seen as threatening the host countries' job market, social services, and public order (Pinyol-Jiménez, 2012). Migration also poses challenges to the identity and culture of the host countries. Migrants burden the social welfare system for those who allow them to stay in their home countries (Weiner, 1992). Hence, the securitization of migration became a common political issue for European countries in the 1990s. However, the securitization process was strengthened at the beginning of the twenty-first century, when 9/11 happened in the United States (Narayan et al., 2017), (Narayan et al., 2023).

Following the event, the European Union also started perceiving the migrants as a threat to the welfare and security of its member states. Jef Huysmans argues that restrictive migration policies have developed along with the European integration project, which has facilitated the control of the internal market and maintained their cultural hegemony to strengthen political solidarity among European states (Huysmans, 2000). Such securitized migration policies helped preserve the nature of the Westphalian state system. He additionally argued that negative migration discourse deprived migrants of availing social, political, and economic rights and subsequently excluded them from the host societies. Consequently, they became the objects of exploitation. However, the increasing hostility towards migration can't be prevented from the challenges. Huysmans believes that the experiences of the last two centuries continue to shape the political identity of the European Union. Recently, the EU has taken initiatives to implement a common migration policy as a mechanism to tackle racism, nationalism, and xenophobia and to maintain the EU's ethos (Awasthi et al. 2019),(Babu et al. 2020).

Securitization and De-securitization Theory

Securitization theory belongs to the broader premises of Critical Security Studies, which derives its legitimacy from the Constructivist School in international relations. It is formulated on the assumption that security is not an objective fact but a socially constructed phenomenon. The Copenhagen School of Security Studies originally developed the theory of securitization, which included Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. It involves mainly three components: first, a referent object that is perceived to be existentially threatened has a legitimate claim to survival; second, a securitizing agent that initiates speech-acts by proclaiming the referent object to be existentially threatened; and third, functional actors who shape the dynamics of a sector (Buzan et al., 1998). Securitization theory features the process through which security threats are constructed. The securitization process is initiated by speech acts that raise politicized or non-politicized issues in the realm of security. The securitization of an object takes place through the securitizing moves. The securitizing moves refer to referent objects which need to be protected by the securitizing actors. The Copenhagen School of Security Studies focuses on securitizing moves as speech acts. The Copenhagen School draws its understanding of speech acts from the speech act theory developed by Austin and Searle. According to this school, 'security' is not just a speech act or social construction. Still, a specific type of act makes a particular speech act a security act, i.e., a securitization and calls for extraordinary actions beyond normal politics (Williams, 2003). The success of securitization is decided by the audience to whom the securitizing actor performs speech acts as a securitizing move.

Desecuritisation is the process through which a threat is no longer perceived as an existential threat (Salter, 2008). Through de-securitization, the status of securitization reduces to that of politicization. It leads to the normalization of the relationship between the securitizing actors and the threatening objects. The audience is a crucial factor in the process of securitization and de-securitization.

Conceptualization of Societal Security

Analyzing the migration-security nexus, this paper primarily evaluates threat perceptions on identity due to migration in Germany and Hungary. According to the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, the threat to identity has been conceptualized as societal security. Identity is the organizing concept in societal security. Also, societal security should be understood as something other than social security. Social security aims at individuals, whereas societal security refers to collectives and their identity. Societal security

was originally elaborated for contemporary European societies. Here, society is not about the state population but the community one identifies with. When such communities perceive a threat to their survival as a community, it becomes a matter of societal insecurity (Buzan et al., 1998). These societies, fundamentally about identity, have been the central focus of this new conception of security in Europe. They enable a group of people to refer to themselves as 'we' and outside societies as 'Others.' Threats to identity 'we' often contribute to the reproduction of 'us' and call 'Others' as 'them.' Migration threatens the 'we' identity, as migrating people carry different identities. The formation of new identities in Europe has challenged the defining status of 'we,' 'us,' and 'them,' and Germany and Hungary are not intact.

Theorizing the National Identity

A nation is an imagined community in an anthropological spirit because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their community (Anderson, 1991). The national ideology binds people within the conceptual boundary of the national community and excludes others. In each nation, processes of national ideological production, over time, isolate particular historical events, cultural aspects, languages, and other features to serve as imagined boundaries between insiders and outsiders (West, 2000). These boundaries differentiate 'us' from 'them.' The social communication of national ideology forms the national identity. National identity is the social construction based on an ascriptive theory of ethnic and national community rather than primordial or reflective of the sum of objective differences between cultures. It can be defined as collectively developed knowledge over time (Barth, 1969).

A nation-specific identity is a commitment to the nation in which an individual establishes a relationship with his national group. People strive for affiliation with their group based on emotions and values, which implies the existence of other groups simultaneously. Consequently, the difference between his group and the different groups inevitably differentiates 'Our' identity from the 'Others' in Europe. The manifestation of one's group and its culture as civilized, technologically advanced, and racially superior always promotes ethnocentric sentiments, which results in the undervaluation of the other groups.

Tracing German National Identity

Even today, Germany's racist tradition and anti-zionist attitude cause highly distorted perceptions against other ethnic minorities, and hence, they are subjected to structural discrimination and exclusion. Historically, the foundation of the German nation-state in 1871 was based on homogenized identity. A geographical boundary was drawn to invoke national consciousness among their people. This national identity caused a national self-conception through which the nation was imagined not as a voluntary community of citizens but as a *Volksgemeinschaft* with a common ancestry and bloodline (Wippermann, 1999). The principle of descent provided for the *völkisch* conception of a nation-state. Germany was conceived as a racially homogeneous nation, premised upon a biologist model of the social body, i.e., *Volkskörper.* It assumed two categories, Germanness and whiteness, as mechanisms for constructing a collective understanding of the nation, which is German national identity. This German construction of national identity is essential for two reasons. First, the equivalence of Germanness or whiteness with purity and supremacy provided the basis for a superior self-conception of the white German majority. Second, it determines the social construction of individuals as being defined as foreign or alien (Campt, 2004). This national discourse of national purity constantly renewed racist, anti-zionist, and anti-semitic ideologies through a racialized and racializing exercise of power. It not only gave Germany scientific authority to decide the fate of the German population but also simultaneously legitimized political practices of exclusion, deportation, and even murder of aliens, which was implemented on a practical level in the Third Reich (Steyerl, 2003).

In the postwar order of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the end of the National Socialist dictatorship created the myth of a new beginning based on symbolic politics, contrary to historical facts and circumstances. Both FRG and GDR were in search of their own national identities. In the GDR, the communists created a new national identity based on socialist principles, which failed. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, after the reunification of FRG and GDR, a united Germany ensured a complete break from its incriminating history (Orlow, 2006).

Based on the blood right, the West German citizenship law was restrictive; hence, the *Gastarbeiters,* welcomed during the 1960s and 1970s and stayed there, were either assimilated or integrated into a multicultural society (Fulbrook, 1994). There were undoubtedly perceptions of the German public that contributed to the general perception of foreigners as illegal migrants in the country. These illicit migrants are intruders, and therefore, they are threats to German culture. However, the Federal Republic of Germany has implemented various multicultural policies to address the opportunities and challenges of the country's cultural diversity. These

policies promote integration, ensure equal rights and opportunities, and encourage intercultural dialogue (Strasser, 1997). Following the multicultural path, the former German Chancellor Angela Merkel welcomed the refugees during the 2015 crisis.

Tracking Hungarian National Identity

The history of the Hungarian people dates back to the late ninth century when the Magyar tribes crossed the Carpathian mountains from the steppes and settled in Pannonia. The Magyar spoke the Finno-Ugrian language, which does not belong to the Indo-European languages. The Hungarian Kingdom was founded during the reign of St. Stephen. In 1526, the Turks killed the king of Hungary at Mohacs and occupied the central part of the kingdom. Later, the Habsburg rulers of Austria ousted the Turks from Hungary and incorporated the entire kingdom into the Habsburg monarchy (West, 2000). In the middle of the nineteenth century, Hungarian resistance took shape against the Habsburg monarchy, leading to the 1848 revolution. While the Hungarian Revolution was suppressed with the help of Russians, Hungary was granted home rule in 1867. In the same year, the Habsburg monarchy was remodeled as an Austro-Hungarian or Dual monarchy, and Hungary was allowed to have its parliament.

After establishing the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Hungarians gained shared sovereignty within the empire. However, it was state-nation sovereignty. Hungary gained nation-state sovereignty after 1920. The possibility of democratic transition was crushed by the Soviet military dominance after the Second World War. The political system in Hungary was characterized by dictatorship until 1989. In the aftermath of Soviet disintegration in 1989, Hungary emerged as a full-fledged nation-state in Europe. Hungarian identity has long been represented in terms of ethnic groups with Hungarian ethnic identities and belongs to those with Hungarian nationality (Jenei, 2020).

Since the outbreak of the refugee crisis, the Hungarian government has been using identity rhetoric to preserve the Hungarian national identity; however, what constitutes the Hungarian national identity is still being determined. Many interpretations of Hungarian national identity exist, but none defines what constitutes it. According to Prime Minister Orbán, the Hungarian is a unique kind with a distinctive language and culture. The representatives of the Hungarian far-right consider Hungary ethnically homogeneous, believing in Christianity and sharing a common language, culture, and values. (Krekó et al., 2019).

Orbán once mentioned that 'the Hungarian nation is a community, not a sum of individuals'. This community is based on common ethnic origin, common descent, and shared belief in Christianity. Orbán's depiction of the Hungarian nation as a community completely fits into the *Gemeinschaft* conception of nation, which the Copenhagen School used to describe societal security. Hence, this paper considers Hungarian as one who fluently speaks Hungarian, shares common descent, and believes in Christianity.

Willkommenskultur and De-securitization of Migration in Germany

When hundreds of thousands of refugees arrived in Europe in August 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel adopted an open-door policy and welcomed them. On the 25th of August, the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (BAMF) decided to suspend the Dublin regulation for Syrian refugees; consequently, the refugees were sent back to the first European Union country they entered. After a week, during the summer press conference of the German government on 31st August, Merkel declared *'Wir schaffen das'* (i.e., We can manage it) and granted protection to hundreds of thousands of refugees on its border. Merkel called it a national duty and insisted their people should behave humanely with them (Mushaben, 2017). In September, Austria and Germany accepted refugees stuck in Hungary. At Munich's railway station, the German volunteers welcomed hundreds of refugees, which showed Germany's *Willkommenskultur*, and hence, it became the most desirable destination for refugees and asylum seekers in Europe. Later in the same month, Merkel invoked a particular case in the Schengen Agreement, which allowed for sovereign control of territorial borders during humanitarian emergencies. According to Germany's Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), around 890,000 asylum seekers came to Germany in 2015 (BAMF, 2015).

The failure of the Common Asylum Policy due to the massive influx of refugees during the 2015 event shook the legitimacy of the European Union. Even Europe's fundamental asylum policy, i.e., the Dublin Agreements, was criticized and called for amendments by the EU members (Deliso, 2017). Though member states agreed upon Dublin III in 2013, it was not successfully implemented in all states by 2015. However, Merkel's decision to override the Dublin regulations granted a legal way for migrants to apply for asylum, bypassing other member states they entered. The German Chancellor's unilateral response to the refugee crisis lightened the shivering confidence in the EU as a policy leader in crisis. Merkel repeatedly called on member states to take responsibility for the equitable distribution of refugees. Despite severe resistance from the leaders of Central and Eastern European states, Germany was among

the first to call for fair and regular distribution quotas among the member states. In a statement to the Bundestag on 15th December 2015, Merkel confirmed that closing borders is not sensible during difficult times. According to Merkel, in a borderless Schengen area, it was fundamentally wrong to compel migrants not to stay where they wanted. Germany was able to forward a European solution to the refugee crisis during the financial, Eurozone, and Lisbon Treaty crises.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel's 2016 New Year's Eve address mentioned the German economy and employment strategy; however, the address focused on immigration and its integration into German society. She also asked the German people why they should help them. Merkel invoked the German identity, which leans on a humanitarian responsibility to help people, regardless of their origin and religion. According to the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, her address brought the refugee crisis down to everyday politics, i.e., de-securitization. Germany challenged the securitization narratives from Hungary and Italy and stated that 'it is natural to help refugees.' Merkel created a new narrative about immigrants: they are neither threats nor burdens on society. She challenges the securitization narratives and reiterates the benefits of immigration for European society and culture. However, she never asserts they are a panacea to the German economy, demography, or labor shortage issues. Merkel only explains that hitherto existing human society has always benefited from successful immigration, both socially and economically.

Moreover, she refers to the United Germany as defined in terms of multicultures, ethnicities, nationalities, religions, races, and languages. Merkel refuses to accept *Leitkultur*, which implies cynical views against multiculturalism, nationalism, and pluralism. German identity leans not only on the acceptance of migrants but also on the support and solidarity of cosmopolitan liberal ideas.

Merkel's first Bundestag address de-securitizes refugees and asylum seekers (Euronews, 2016). Her narrative once again emphasizes the strength, solidarity, and will of everyone. Instead of perceiving the refugees as an existential threat, her optimistic views call for the other leaders to look beyond it. She insists on everyone's cooperation to handle the crisis. Merkel perceives the refugee crisis as a matter of everyday politics, which does not require exceptional measures. She believes German society and economy are in a 'state of asecurity' (Rumelili, 2015). Therefore, the German people need not to worry about immigration. Together, they will benefit and become prosperous. Her assertion is in direct opposition to Viktor Orbán's securitization discourse that views migrants as threats to their society and national identity.

Identity Rhetoric and Securitization of Migration in Hungary

Hungarian national identity has been an essential factor in the recent debates during the refugee crisis in Hungary. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has vehemently opposed the migrants into his country and portrayed them as a threat to Hungary's identity as a nation. He proved to be the most influential political figure in Hungary. He made several statements while delivering speeches to securitize the migration. Analyzing the migration-security nexus, this paper only examines the societal arguments of Orbán between January 2015 and December 2016.

One of the most important arguments for the securitization of migration was constructed upon the ideas of national identity, national values, and cultural inheritance in Hungary. Orbán government launched a campaign in 2015 after returning home from Paris, where he attended a vigil for people who died in the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks. For the first time, refugees became a significant topic of debate across Europe, and Hungary led the campaign. Although Hungary didn't experience substantial immigration in early 2015, Orbán warned the refugees if they come to Hungary, they must respect Hungarian culture, abide by our rules and regulations, and can't snatch our jobs' (Kiss, 2016). By mentioning Hungarian culture, Orbán gained success in instilling cultural nationalism into his nationals and differentiated his countrymen from the refugees. He completely discarded Multiculturalism and said Hungary would be spared its effects at any cost (Dunai & Stonestreet, 2015). He also mentioned that multiculturalism has failed in Europe, and the European Union wants Hungary to pay its price (Visegrád Post, 2017).

Orbán called the refugees a threat to Hungarian society and its identity. Orbán demonized the migrants and told Hungary would never be an immigration destination while he was Prime Minister. (Rettman, 2015). He made a statement in 2015 that mass migration threatened the security of the Europeans because it brought with it an exponentially increased threat of terrorism. Orbán linked immigration with the threat of terrorism. The same year, Orbán and his party, 'The Federation of Young Democrats' (Fidesz), held 'A National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism,' in which formulations and procedures were partially criticized by opposition parties. Nevertheless, it became successful. According to a survey conducted by Eurobarometer in September 2015, 65 percent of Hungarian people perceived immigration as a severe threat to their identity and culture (Eurobarometer, 2015).

Hungary held a referendum in October 2016 against the European Union's plan to resettle 160000 asylum seekers throughout Europe under the EU migrant quota system, of which around 1294 would be resettled in Hungary (Frost, 2019). According to the EU migrant quota system, refugees would be resettled based on countries' asylum applications, population sizes, unemployment rates, and GDPs. Hungary had opposed the policy with political and legal means. The Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán believed that the quota system would change the ethnic, cultural, and religious profile of Hungary and Europe. The ballot asked if the European Parliament be given authority over the Hungarian government without the approval of the Hungarian government (Gessler, 2017). He asked the people of Hungary whether the European Union had the legal right to advise the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarians without the approval of Hungary's National Assembly. Orbán argued that the referendum was an issue of identity and sovereignty. He raised the question of national sovereignty against the European Union.

Also, nationalism is closely related to xenophobia in Hungary. Most Hungarian nationals do not want the 'Others' to become members of their national community and have hostile attitudes, behaviors, and prejudices against them. The Political Capital's Demand for Right-Wing Extremism Index shows that xenophobia in Hungary is higher than most of the post-socialist Eastern European block. According to the Pew Research Centre data, 72 percent of Hungarian nationals had unfavorable opinions against Muslims in 2016 (Kreko et al., 2019). Hungarians considered refugees a major threat more than the average European. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán had been worried that the resettlement of refugees could destroy European culture, particularly Hungarian culture. It could even result in the Islamisation of Hungary over time. According to an article, Orbán called refugees as Muslim invaders and announced that the Muslim and Christian communities can never unite (Schultheis, 2018). He has been advocating for keeping Europe European and Hungary Hungarian. Jobbik also claimed that 'Hungary is for Hungarians' and held that 'the Hungarians are some kind of historical and cultural community, who believe in the protection of Christianity.'

The notion of the 'Our' and the 'Others' is fundamental and relevant to understanding the anti-immigration, anti-Muslim, and anti-Islam rhetoric of the Hungarian government (Tremlett & Missing, 2015). The securitization of migration has often been explained using this idea by the representatives of the Hungarian government and particularly by the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The goal of the government representatives' discourses on the 'Others' is to strengthen the sense of belongingness to the nation by differentiating them. The ethnic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities between the migrants and the destination society

initiate 'the process of Othering.' Then, the securitizing agents favor similar identities for their nationals to trust and dissimilar identities to be afraid of (Geertz, 1973). According to this view, a group with a shared identity always tries to protect themselves from 'Others.' The conflict is inevitable here, and the 'Others' are perceived as a severe threat to 'Our' identity (Karamik, 2020). Since migrants leave their country of origin outside the European continent and move to Europe, they can never be accepted as Europeans, and hence, they would always remain as 'Others' (Huysmans, 2006).

Implications for European Integration

The change in the Hungarian political system has deepened the illiberal-liberal cleavage in Europe, potentially posing significant challenges to European integration. Most member states would promote democratic values based on Western liberalism through European integration. They never perceived European integration as a tool to reduce their national identity. In the case of Hungary, its membership in the European Union strengthened the national identity throughout the Carpathian Basin. The Hungarian government always promoted the national identity of being a member of Europe and emphasized its coexistence with a European identity. It supports the view that European identity is desirable but not at the expense of national identity. Therefore, the duality of identity is hierarchical, and national identity has always precedence (Butler, 2017).

Angela Merkel and Viktor Orbán always embody Europe's divide on the refugee crisis. Germany welcomed over a million refugees into its territory. At the same time, Hungary rejected a scheme to relocate refugees from Greece and Italy and fenced their border with barbed wire, ignoring the EU Commission's appeals. Following the footprint of Hungary, the Visegrad Four also rejected obligatory relocation quotas and refused to support the Commission for any reform. The increasing clashes of national responses challenge the credibility of the European Union as an influential actor and leader in international relations, particularly in crises (BBC, 2018). The nation-centric vision of the leaders has profoundly impacted the European integration process, as the European Union is a collective project built upon liberal principles for a peaceful and prosperous Europe.

Conclusion

The paper has tried to outline two contrasting discourses on migration vis-a-vis security, i.e., Germany's de-securitization and Hungary's securitization of the refugee crisis of 2015, using the securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. It shows how Germany and Hungary have responded to the situation. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has continued to lead a de-securitization narrative in the European Union. In contrast, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán led an anti-immigrant attitude, i.e., a securitization narrative, to save their national identity. In Germany, the refugees and asylum seekers were not treated as threats; hence, it became a matter of normal politics. In the German case, the process of othering does not take place. The migrants were not portrayed as an existential threat to the German identity, culture, and society.

On the contrary, Hungary treated them as terrorists, put them in the category of high politics, and demanded extraordinary measures to deal with them. The existential threat to Hungarian identity and culture was connected to the depiction of migrants as the 'Others.' In the Hungarian case, the process of othering played an essential part in portraying the migrants as an existential threat to the Hungarian national identity and culture. To illustrate the successful securitization of migration in Hungary, a critical discourse analysis of Orbán's identity rhetoric was made, which depended on a well-reception of the migration issue by the Hungarian Public. In the 2016 surveys, 81 percent of the Hungarian nationals showed strong opposition against migrants (Debomy & Tripier, 2017). The Hungarian government (securitizing agent) became successful in convincing the Hungarian nationals (the audience) regarding the existential threat to Hungarian identity and culture (referent object), which led to the fencing of barbed wire along the Hungarian border and the enactment of new migration policy (extraordinary measures).

However, the above discussion indicates that the 'Others' does not seem to threaten the 'Our' identity in Hungary. Although Hungary received the highest number of asylum applications compared to the other European Union members, the approval rate was meager. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán constructed the migration as a security aspect through his speech acts. Hungary was never the final destination for the asylum seekers; it was Germany. Also, Hungary experienced a sharp decline in the number of migrants. After 2015, the number of asylum seekers in Hungary sharply decreased from 177,135 to 29,432 in 2016, eventually to 3,397 in 2017 (KSH, 2018). Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party successfully used the migration issue as an opportunity to serve their political goals, which led to the growth of right-wing populism in Hungary. The Hungarian case demonstrated a successful application of securitization theory. Hence, this paper concludes that the audience has more effectively

accepted the securitization process by Viktor Orbán than the process of de-securitization by Angela Merkel in EU politics.

The paper only studies the securitization and de-securitization process at the state level in the European Union. However, within a state, particularly in Germany, the *Die Linke* party favored welcoming the refugees, whereas the *Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)* party opposed Merkel's open-door policy. Hence, it would be interesting to study what German politics allows and how Germany manages its domestic politics while simultaneously trying to invoke European principles. Therefore, securitization and de-securitization politics within Germany constitute further scope of research.

References

Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Community: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Verso.

Barth, F. (1969). Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Little Brown and Co.

BBC. (2018). Migrants: Merkel and Orban clash over Europe's 'humanity.' *https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44728577*

BAMF. (2015). Migration Report 2015- Central Conclusions. *https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2015-zentrale-ergebnisse.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=13*

Butler, E. (2017). The "In Defense of National Identity" Argument: Comparing the UK and Hungarian Referendums of 2016. EuropeNow.

Buzan, B. (1983). People, States, and Fear: an agenda for international security. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J. D. (1998). Security: a new Framework for Analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Campt, T. (2004). Other Germans: Black Germans and the Politics of Race, Gender, and Memory in the Third Reich. University of Michigan Press.

Chimni, B. S. (1998). *The geopolitics of refugee studies: a view from the South. Journal of Refugee Studies, 11(4), 350-374.*

Debomy, D., & Tripier, A. (2017). *EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE EU FOLLOWING THE PEAK OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS. NOTRE EUROPE. Jacques Delors Institute.* https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/european-public-opinion-and-the-eu-following-the-peak-of-the-migration-crisis/

Deliso, C. (2017). *Migration, Terrorism and the Future of A Divided Europe: A Continent Transformed. Bloomsbury Publishing.*

Dunai, M., & Stonestreet, J. (2015). *Multiculturalism doesn't work in Hungary, says Orban. Reuters.*

Euronews. (2016). *Angela Merkel addresses parliament on the refugee crisis.* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6AJn5IdDV60

Frost, R. (2019). *The Force of Hungarian Identity. The Observer.* https://theobserver-qiaa.org/the-force-of-hungarian-identity

Fullbrook, M. (1994). *Aspects of Society and Identity in New Germany. Daedalus, 123(1), 211-234.*

Geertz, C. (1973). *The Interpretation of Culture. Basic Books.*

Gessler, T. (2017). *The 2016 Referendum in Hungary. East European Quarterly, 45(1-2), 85-97.*

Gibney, M. J. (2004). *The ethics and politics of asylum: liberal democracy and the response to refugees. Cambridge University Press.*

Hesse, A., Kreutzer, K., & Diehl, M. R. (2019). *Dynamics of Institutional Logics in a Cross-Sector Social Partnership: The Case of Refugee Integration in Germany. Journal of Business Ethics, 159(3), 679-704.*

Huysmans, J. (2000). The European Union and the Securitisation of Migration. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(5), 751-777.

Huysmans, J. (2006). The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. Routledge.

IOM. (2018). World Migration Report 2018. https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2018

Jenei, G. (2020). State Sovereignty and National Identity in Hungary. Civic Review, 171-193.

Karamik, I. (2020). Securitized Migration of the Other in Hungary: A Fantasy Created by the Politics of Fear. CESRAN International. https://cesran.org/securitised-migration-of-the-other-in-hungary-a-fantasy-created-by-the-politics-of-fear.html

Kiss, E. (2016). "The Hungarians Have Decided: They Do Not Want Illegal Migrants" Media Representation of the Hungarian Governmental Anti-Immigration Campaign, ACTA HUMANA, 6(1), 45-77.

Krekó, p., Hunyadi, B., & Szicherle, P. (2019). Anti-Muslim populism in Hungary: From the margins to the mainstream. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/anti-muslim-populism-in-hungary-from-the-margins-to-the-mainstream/

KSH. (2018). Asylum Seekers in Hungary and Persons granted international protection status (2000-). https://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_wnvn003.html

Loescher, G. (2001). The UNHCR and World Politics: a perilous path. Oxford University Press.

Mushaben, J. M. (2017). Angela Merkel's Leadership in the Refugee Crisis. Current History, 116(788), 95-100.

Narayan, V., Mehta, R. K., Rai, M., Gupta, A., Singh, M., Verma, S., ... & Yadav, S. (2017). E-Commerce recommendation method based on collaborative filtering technology. International Journal of Current Engineering and Technology, 7(3), 974-982.

Narayan, V., Mehta, R. K., Rai, M., Gupta, A., Tiwari, A., Gautam, D., ... & Sagar, V. (2017). To implement a web page using thread in Java. *International Journal of Current Engineering and Technology, 7(3)*, 926-934.

Awasthi, S., Srivastava, A. P., Srivastava, S., & Narayan, V. (2019, April). A comparative study of various CAPTCHA methods for securing web pages. In *2019 International Conference on Automation, Computational and Technology Management (ICACTM)* (pp. 217-223). IEEE.

Narayan, V., & Daniel, A. K. (2020). Design consideration and issues in wireless sensor network deployment.

Babu, S. Z., Pandey, D., Narayan, V., Al Zubayer, A., & Sheik, I. (2020). Abridgement of Business Data Drilling with the Natural Selection and Recasting Breakthrough: Drill Data With GA. *Authors Profile Tarun Danti Dey is doing Bachelor in LAW from Chittagong Independent University, Bangladesh. Her research discipline is business intelligence, LAW, and Computational thinking. She has done, 3.*

Narayan, V., Babu, S. Z. D., Ghonge, M. M., Mall, P. K., Sharma, S., Srivastava, S., ... & Tyagi, L. K. (2023). 7 Extracting business methodology: using artificial intelligence-based method. *Semantic Intelligent Computing and Applications, 16*, 123.

Orlow, D. (2006). The GDR's Failed Search for a National Identity, 1945-1989. *German Studies Review, 29(3)*, 537-558.

Pinyol-Jiménez, G. (2012). The Migration-Security Nexus in Short: Instruments and Actions in the European Union. *Amsterdam Law Dorum, 4(1)*, 36-57.

Quinn, E. (2016). The Refugee and Migrant Crisis: Europe's Challenge. *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review. 105(419)*, 275-285.

Rettman, A. (2015). Orban demonizes immigrants at the Paris march. *EUobserver.*

Rumelili, B. (2015). Identity and desecuritization: the pitfalls of conflating ontological and physical security. *Journal of International Relations and Development, 18(1)*, 52-74.

Salter, M. B. (2008). Securitization and Desecuritization: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. *Journal of International Relations and Development, 11(4)*, 321-349.

Schultheis, E. (2018). Viktor Orbán: Hungary doesn't want 'Muslim invaders'. *POLITICO.eu.*

Steyerl, H. (2003). Postkolonialismus und Biopolitik: Probleme der Übertragung postkolonialer Ansätze im deutschen Kontext. Sprechen die Subalterne deutsch? Migration und postkoloniale Kritik (pp. 38-55). Unrast.

Strasser, H. (1997). The German Debate over Multicultural Society: Climax or Test of Organised Capitalism. The Canadian Journal of Sociology, 22(2), 243-258.

Tremlett, A., & Messing, V. (2015). Hungary's future: anti-immigration, anti-multiculturalism, and anti-Roma? openDemocracy. *https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/hungarys-future-antiimmigration-antimulticulturalism-and-antiro/*

Visegrád Post. (2017). Orbán: "Multiculturalism has failed in Europe." *https://visegradpost.com/en/2017/06/30/orban-multiculturalism-has-failed-in-europe/*

Weiner, M. (1992). Security, Stability and International Migration. International Security, 17(3), 91-126.

West, B. A. (2000). Segments of Self and Other: The Magyar Hungarian Case. National Identities, 2(1), 49-64.

Williams, M. C. (2003). Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. International Studies Quarterly, 47(4), 511-531.

Wippermann, W. (1999). Das 'ius sanguinis' und die Minderheiten im deutschen Kaiserreich. Nationale Minderheiten und staatliche Minderheitenpolitik in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert (pp. 133-143). Akademie.